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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
RONALD DEAN UDY,

CaseNo.20100726-CA

Defendant/Appellant.

INTRODUCTION
First, this Court should reverse because the trial court violated double jeopardy by
entering an increased sentence at the August review hearing. Ronald Dean Udy had a
legitimate expectation of finality in the oral sentencing decision imposed at the May
sentencing hearing because the trial court did not expressly reserve the option to change
that oral sentencing decision at the August review hearing. Neither the trial court's
informal remark at the end of the May sentencing hearing nor the unsigned May 3 order
undermined Udy's legitimate expectation of finality. This issue is preserved or can be
reached under rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Second, this Court should reverse because the trial court violated Udy's right to
allocution and due process when it denied Udy and his counsel the opportunity to speak
at the time of sentencing. Udy's opportunity to speak at the May sentencing hearing did
not protect his right to speak when he was resentenced at the August review hearing. This
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issue is preserved or can be reached through the plain error doctrine or rule 22(e). Udy
does not address the remainder of the State's arguments because those arguments are
adequately addressed in the opening brief.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED DOUBLE JEOPARDY BY
ENTERING AN INCREASED SENTENCE AFTER UDY GAINED A
LEGITIMATE EXPECTATION OF FINALITY IN THE ORAL
SENTENCING DECISION IMPOSED AT THE MAY HEARING

First, Udy had a legitimate expectation of finality in the trial court's original
sentence because jeopardy attached to the oral sentencing decision imposed by the court
at the May sentencing hearing and the court did not explicitly reserve the option to
change that oral sentencing decision. See infra Part LA. Second, this Court should reach
the merits of the double jeopardy argument because it is preserved, and the State's claim
to the contrary is inadequately briefed. Alternatively, this Court should reach the merits
because the State does not contest that rule 22(e) applies. Instead, it assumes that rule
22(e) applies and proceeds to the merits of the issue. See infra Part LB.
A.

Udy Had a Legitimate Expectation of Finality in the Original Sentence
Because Jeopardy Attached to the Oral Sentencing Decision Imposed at the
May Sentencing Hearing and the Trial Court Did Not Explicitly Reserve the
Option to Change That Oral Sentencing Decision.
The State asserts that the trial court "explicitly stayed imposition of the sentence at

the May hearing" until the August review hearing. Appellee Br. at 13. It claims that its
assertion is "clearly demonstrate[d]" by the record. Id. at 20-21. And it insists that "the
trial court did everything it reasonably could to prevent [the] May sentence from
becoming the final judgment." Id. at 17.
2
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To support its assertion, the State presents this summary of the proceedings: At the
May sentencing hearing, the court "announced a prison sentence," but then "immediately
'stay[ed] the imposition of that sentence.'" Appellee Br. at 13 (citing R.287:51). The
court stayed the imposition of sentence at Udy's "own request" in order to allow Udy "to
make one final effort to pay restitution before deciding the question of incarceration." Id.
at 20 (citing R.287:49-50). "The trial court never stated that jail would commence after
the August hearing depending on whether [Udy] had paid restitution." Id. at 21 (citing
R.287:53). Rather, the court "told [Udy] that the sentence proposed at the May hearing
depended entirely on [Udy's] subsequent behavior and that the sentence would be finally
decided in August." IdL at 17 (citing R.287:51-53). The court "told [Udy] he might be
sent to prison should he not pay restitution by August." Id (citing R.287:53). When the
court spoke about probation, it "referred to future probation after serving some
commitment." Id at 18 (citing R.287:51). At the August hearing, defense counsel stated
"that he understood that whether or not" Udy was sentenced to prison that day "depended
on whether [Udy] had paid restitution by that date." Id. (citing R.288:2).
The record does not support the State's recitation of the proceedings. The State
cites the May sentencing hearing transcript and the August review hearing transcript to
supports its assertions. Excerpts from those transcripts are attached to the opening brief at
Addenda D and E for the Court's review. Those pages show that:
1. The trial court did not postpone the imposition of sentence until the August
review hearing. When the court said at the May sentencing hearing that it would "stay the
imposition of that sentence," it was stating that the prison terms would be stayed in favor
3
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of a jail term and probation. R.287:51 ("I'm going to give [Udy] 1 to 15 on the two
second degree felonies; zero to 5 on the third; stay the imposition of that sentence. I'm
going to make him do a year in jail. And then after the year in jail, he'll be on 36 months
probation."); see R.288:4 (court explaining that it "suspended" the prison terms at the
May sentencing hearing). The court's decision was consistent with common practice and
Utah law. See Utah Code §77-18-l(2)(a) (Supp. 2010) (allowing court to, "after imposing
sentence, suspend the execution of the sentence and place the defendant on probation");
id. at §77-18-l(8)(a)(v) (allowing court to "require that the defendant... serve a period
of time, not to exceed one year, in a county jail" "as a condition of probation").
2. Udy did not ask the trial court to postpone the sentence so that he could make a
final effort to pay restitution before being sentenced. To the contrary, defense counsel
told the court that Udy was "ready to go forward" with sentencing that day. R.287:51.
3. The trial court did not tell Udy that the sentence imposed at the May hearing
depended on Udy's behavior or that the sentence would not be finally decided until
August. On the contrary, the court said, "I'm ready to sentence [Udy]." R.287:51. It then
sentenced Udy to prison, but stayed the prison terms and ordered Udy to serve "a year in
jail" and "36 months probation." R.287:51. Regarding the August review hearing, the
court told Udy that if "[y]ou have these people paid off because this money has come in
in the 60 day time frame, I'll reconsider the jail sentence and I may cut it down."
R.287:51. But "if you don't, you're going to do the year regardless." R.287:51.
4. The trial court did not tell Udy that he might be sent to prison if he did not pay
restitution by August. Appellee Br. at 17. Nor did the trial court loosely refer to "some
4
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commitment" to be served before probation. See id. at 18. Rather, the court told Udy that
he would serve a "year in jail" and "36 months probation." R.287:51. The court then told
Udy that it would "reconsider the jail sentence" and possibly "cut it down" if Udy paid
the restitution by the August review hearing. R.287:51.
5. Defense counsel did not say at the August review hearing that he understood
that whether Udy was sentenced to prison that day depended on whether Udy had paid
the restitution. To the contrary, defense counsel said that his "understanding [was] that
the prison was suspended" and that Udy "was sentenced to one year in the Salt Lake
County Jail." R.288:4. Defense counsel also said that his understanding was that if Udy
had paid the restitution by the August review hearing "there would be a discount" in the
jail sentence, "but not that there would be additional--." R.288:4-5. Defense counsel
could not complete his statement, however, because the trial court interrupted him.
R.288:5; see Appellant Br. at 32-40; infra Part II.A (discussing why trial court's
interruptions deprived Udy of his rights to allocution and due process).
In reality, the State's argument rests on an informal comment made by the trial
judge at the end of the May sentencing hearing and the unsigned May 3 order. Neither of
these facts, however, undermined Udy's legitimate expectation of finality in the sentence.
First, the court's informal remark at the end of the May sentencing hearing did not
undermine Udy's legitimate expectation of finality because the court did not expressly
reserve sentencing until the August review hearing. After the court imposed sentence at
the May hearing, the court and counsel discussed the logistics of the restitution payment.
R.287:51-53. As that discussion ended, the State commented that the check would have
5
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to clear before the restitution money could be delivered to the creditors. R.287:53. In
response, the court said, "Well, I know that. The check's got to clear. We're going to be
realistic here. But if that makes everybody feel good, and I know some of you—we had a
mixed group here, I think, but I'm going to give him that time frame and if the money's
not there, he's at least going to go to jail, and he may go to prison." R.287:53.
It is evident from the record that none of the parties perceived the court's comment
as anything more than an offhand remark. Defense counsel responded to the remark by
saying, "Thank you, Your Honor," and continuing the discussion about restitution.
R.287:53. And the State remained silent. R.287:53. If the State perceived the remark as a
revocation of the already-imposed sentence, it should have requested clarification and
asked whether the court intended to postpone sentencing until the August review hearing.
R.287:53; see United States v. Husein, 478 F.3d 318, 339-40 (6th Cir. 2007) (noting
government could have "asked the court to" delay sentencing, but it "never" did and
"[i]ts afterthought on appeal simply comes too late"). That the State did not ask for
clarification is evidence that it, like Udy, understood the comment as an offhand remark
and felt satisfied with the sentence imposed by the trial court. R.287:45 (prosecutor
stating that the State was not seeking prison time in Udy's case).
Thus, as explained in the opening brief, to the extent that the trial court's informal
remark carried any weight at all, it did not eliminate Udy's legitimate expectation in the
finality of the sentence. See Appellant Br. at 27-28; State v. Horrocks, 2001 UT App 4,
1J25, 17 P.3d 1145 (double jeopardy allows a trial court to "change an oral sentencing
decision when it has specifically reserved that option pending receipt of further
6
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information relevant to sentencing" (emphasis added)). Rather, the remark should be
interpreted consistently with the sentence: Udy could receive a reduced jail term if he
paid the restitution by the August review hearing; otherwise, he would serve a year in jail
and thirty-six months of probation, and he could be sent to prison if he violated his
probation. See Appellant Br. at 27-28.
Second, the lack of a signature on the May 3 order does not undermine Udy's
expectation of finality because Udy's expectation of finality arose from the trial court's
oral sentencing decision. The State claims that the court must have rescinded the sentence
it imposed at the May sentencing hearing because it did not sign the May 3 Sentence,
Judgment, Commitment order. See Appellee Br. at 14, 17. But it is the oral sentencing
decision, not the final signed order, to which jeopardy attaches.
The State concedes that Horrocks provides "the proper framework for analyzing
when jeopardy attaches to judgments." Appellee Br. at 15 n.2. Horrocks says that "a final
signed order" is not required for jeopardy to attach. Horrocks, 2001 UT App 4, ^[23.
Rather, jeopardy attaches to "an oral sentencing decision" unless the court "expressly
decline [s] to impose a final sentence until it has had the opportunity to review sentencing
information." Id. at ^[23-24.* In this case, as explained above and in the opening brief,

1

Although State v. Todd, 2006 UT 7, 128 P.3d 1199, does not address double jeopardy, it
too recognizes the importance of "the oral announcement of the sentence" in determining
a defendant's understanding of the sentence. Todd, 2006 UT 7, ^|8. That case holds that
"the oral announcement of the sentence" triggers "the ten-day window for filing a motion
for new trial" because "the defendant is much more likely to be immediately aware of the
precise date of the oral announcement of the sentence." Id. Thus, Todd held that "the date
of the oral announcement of the sentence to the defendant is the date of imposition of
sentence^br all purposes." Id. (emphasis added).
7
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the court did not expressly decline to impose sentence until the August review hearing.
To the contrary, it imposed sentence at the May sentencing hearing and set the August
review hearing for the purpose of reducing the jail sentence if Udy successfully paid the
restitution. See Appellant Br. at 23-29. Thus, jeopardy attached because Udy developed a
legitimate expectation of finality in the sentence, and the court was prohibited from
increasing that sentence at the review hearing. See Husein, 47 8F.3d at 338.
B.

This Court Can Review Udy's Double Jeopardy Claim Because the State
Inadequately Briefed Its Claim that the Issue Is Not Preserved and/or
Because Udy's Sentence Is Illegal and Was Imposed in an Illegal Manner,
This Court should reach the merits of the double jeopardy argument because it is

properly preserved (or the failure to properly preserve it constituted ineffective assistance
of counsel, see Appellant Br. at 30 n.2) and because it is an illegal sentence that may be
corrected at any time under rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
The State claims that Udy did not preserve the double jeopardy claim below. See
Appellee Br. at 11. The State, however, does not support its argument with any analysis
or citations to case law or the record. See id. Thus, this Court should disregard the State's
preservation argument because it is inadequately briefed. See Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9),
(b), (k) (appellee brief must contain "citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the
record relied on"; briefs that "are not in compliance may be disregarded or stricken, on
motion or sua sponte by the court"); State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998)
(holding issue is inadequately briefed "when the overall analysis of the issue is so lacking
as to shift the burden of research and argument to the reviewing court").

8
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Moreover, the State's summarily raised preservation argument overlooks pages
four through five of the August review hearing transcript, where defense counsel
questioned the trial court's authority to amend the sentence at the August review hearing.
R.288:4-5. It also overlooks defense counsel's Motion to Correct Sentence under rule
22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. See R.235-60.
Perhaps, the State intends to argue that the issue is not preserved because defense
counsel never used the phrase "double jeopardy" when preserving the issue for appeal.
As explained in the opening brief, however, defense counsel's argument was sufficient to
preserve the double jeopardy issue because it followed the traditional double jeopardy
analysis and it satisfied both policies of the preservation rule. See Appellant Br. at 29-30.
Even if an issue is raised "indirectly," it is properly preserved so long as it is
"'raised to a level of consciousness such that the trial judge can consider it.'" State v.
Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 361 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (citation omitted). Thus, in State v.
Garcia, 2007 UT App 228, 164 P.3d 1264, this Court held that the State's argument
relying on the "Franks doctrine" was preserved even though "the State did not formally
cite the Franks case below," because it "argued the underlying premise of the Franks
doctrine" and this Court had "no doubt the trial court was on notice of the State's legal
argument." Garcia, 2007 UT App 228, If 10; see, e.g., State v. Bui an, 2006 Utah App 322,
ffl[21-22, 142 P.3d 581 (holding "counsel's objections, in conjunction with the court's
reliance on rule 801, were sufficient to preserve the issue for appeal" because "both of the
policies articulated in Holgate" were satisfied and "the trial court clearly understood that
counsel's objection pertained to rule 801"), affd, 2008 UT 47; see State v. Valenzuela,
9
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2001 UT App 332, ^}25 n.4, 37 P.3d 260 (addressing the identity issue even though it was
not specifically preserved because defendant preserved the probable cause issue and the
identity issue was included in the probable cause issue); Nielsen v. Pioneer Valley Hosp.,
830 P.2d 270, 272 (Utah 1992) (stating that although "[defendant's] objections were not
textbook examples of specificity," they nonetheless "adequately directed the trial judge's
attention to the claimed error" such that "they were sufficient").
In sum, the "preservation requirement is self-imposed and is therefore one of
prudence rather than jurisdiction." Patterson v. Patterson, 2011 UT 68, ^[13, — P.3d —.
Given the State's failure to explain why it believes the issue is not preserved, therefore,
this Court should "exercise" its "wide discretion" to address the issue on appeal. Id.
Besides, as explained in the opening brief, there is no need for this Court to
determine whether the issue is adequately preserved because this Court may reach the
issue under rule 22(e). See Appellant Br. at 30-31. In the response brief, the State says
that it will not "conced[e]" that rule 22(e) applies, but it provides no argument as to why
rule 22(e) would not apply. See Appellee Br. at 11. Instead, it "assum[es] .. . that rule
22(e) provides a remedy for violations of double jeopardy at sentencing" and proceeds to
the merits of the issue. Id. Thus, despite the State's summary claim that the double
jeopardy argument is not preserved and its summary assertion that it does not concede the
applicability of rule 22(e), this Court should reach the merits of the claim because it is
preserved and because the State essentially concedes that rule 22(e) applies.

10
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II.

THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED UDY'S RIGHTS TO ALLOCUTION
AND DUE PROCESS WHEN IT DENIED UDY AND HIS COUNSEL
THE OPPORTUNITY TO SPEAK AT THE TIME OF SENTENCING
First, Udy's rights to allocution and due process were violated because Udy and

defense counsel were denied the opportunity to speak at the time of sentencing. See infra
Part II. A. Second, this Court should reach the merits of the issue because the issue is
preserved and the State inadequately briefed its argument to the contrary, Udy has shown
that the error was prejudicial under the plain error doctrine, and Udy's sentence is an
illegal sentence that may be corrected at any time under rule 22(e). See infra Part II.B.
A.

Udy's Rights to Allocution and Due Process Were Violated Because Udy and
Defense Counsel Were Denied the Opportunity to Speak At the Time of
Sentencing.
The State claims that Udy's rights to allocution and due process were not violated

at the August review hearing because they were protected at the May sentencing hearing.
See Appellee Br. at 23-28. The State's argument follows the same reasoning it employed
in its double jeopardy argument—the August review hearing "was merely a continuation
and conclusion of the sentencing hearing that began in May." Id. at 24. As explained in
Part I, this argument fails because it is not supported by the record. See supra Part LA.
The record shows that the May hearing was a complete sentencing hearing at
which Udy's rights to allocution and due process were protected and the trial court
imposed a legal sentence. See Appellant Br. at 35. As explained by the trial court, the
August hearing was a review hearing: The court sentenced Udy to jail time and
probation, but agreed to hold a "review" hearing in August in order to consider reducing
the "jail sentence" if Udy had "paid off the restitution by then. R.287:51. When Udy and
11
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his counsel appeared at the August hearing, however, it became apparent that this was not
the review hearing promised by the trial court, but a new sentencing hearing. The court
announced: "I initially said that I was going to give him a year in jail," but "I've revisited
this in my head." R.288:3-4. The court then imposed a new, much harsher, sentence:
"He's going to prison to be taken forthwith, 1 to 15, zero to 5 concurrent." R.288:3.
Udy does not complain that he was denied "the unlimited right to continue
allocuting for as long as [he] wish[ed]." Appellee Br. at 28. Rather, he asserts that his
right to allocution was violated because he and his attorney were not allowed to speak at
the time of sentencing. Appellant Br. at 32-38. The right to allocution demands that the
defendant and his counsel be given the opportunity to speak "[a]t the time of sentence."
Utah Code §77-18-1(7); see Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a) ("Before imposing sentence the court
shall afford the defendant an opportunity to make a statement and to present any
information in mitigation of punishment.. ."); State v. Milligan, 2011 UT App 390, ^[16,
265 P.3d 132 (remanding for resentencing because trial court denied the right to
allocution by amending an illegal sentence without granting defendant the opportunity to
argue for concurrent sentences at the time the illegal sentence was corrected).
The right to speak at the time of sentence was critical in this case because the trial
court's sentencing decision at the August review hearing was discretionary, and the
denial of allocution at that hearing led the court to impose a harsher sentence based on
speculation. The court did not allow Udy to explain why he had not received the art
project commission yet. R.288:l-2. Instead, it concluded that Udy "lied to me" about the
commission and "he's going to pay the price." R.288:4; see R.288:5 ("[H]e lied to me.
12
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And I think I have a right to pull the plug on that because of his conduct."); R.288:5
("And he has an obligation to this Court to tell me the truth and he didn't. So he's going
to prison."). Further, the trial court accepted as true the State's speculation that the
commission would never materialize because Udy "is probably being scammed and he's
taken some of... this latest money that he's received from people, sent it on to this
bigger fish that's scamming him." R.288:3. Thus, this Court should vacate the August 3
sentencing order and impose the original May 3 sentencing order because the trial court
violated Udy's rights to allocution and due process at the August review hearing.
B.

This Court Can Review This Issue on Appeal Because the Issue is Preserved
and the State's Argument to the Contrary Is Inadequately Briefed, the Trial
Court's Error Was Plain, and Udy's Sentence Is Illegal and May Be
Corrected at Any Time Under Rule 22(e).
This Court should reach the merits of the allocution issue because it is properly

preserved and the State's argument to the contrary is inadequately briefed, because the
trial court's error was plain, or because Udy's sentence is an illegal one that may be
corrected at any time under rule 22(e).
The allocution issue is properly preserved. The State claims that Udy did not
preserve the allocution claim below, but the State does not support its argument with any
analysis or citations to case law or the record. See Appellee Br. at 11. Thus, this Court
should disregard the State's preservation argument because it is inadequately briefed. See
Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9), (b), (k); Thomas, 961 P.2d at 305.
Besides, the State's summarily raised preservation argument overlooks pages one
through five of the August review hearing transcript where defense counsel preserved the
13
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issue by repeatedly attempting to speak on Udy's behalf, but was prevented from doing
so by the trial court. See R.288:l-5. As explained in the opening brief, defense counsel's
repeated attempts to speak preserved the issue for appeal because they satisfied both
purposes of the preservation rule. See Appellant Br. at 38-39; see Patterson, 2011 UT 68,
1J15 ("in assessing application of our preservation rule, we find it useful to examine its
underlying policies"). This issue can be decided from the record; it does not "'depend[]
on controverted factual questions whose relevance thereto was not made to appear at
trial.'" Id. (citations omitted). Thus, this Court should "exercise" its "wide discretion" to
address the issue on appeal. Id. at ^[13.
Alternatively, this Court may reach the issue under the plain error doctrine. The
State's brief does not address the obviousness of the error. See Appellee Br. at 23. Thus,
the opening brief is adequate to explain obviousness. See Appellant Br. at 39. Moreover,
the State's brief misstates the prejudice standard. The State argues that the prejudice
standard requires Udy to show "that he would have provided the sentencing court with
evidence or argument that would have resulted in a more favorable outcome." Appellee
Br. at 23 (emphasis added); see id. at 30 (claiming Udy "must show that the trial court
likely would have entered a more lenient sentence" (emphasis added)). The State also
argues that the prejudice standard requires Udy to "demonstrate that the court would have
been compelled to believe [his] argument or evidence." Id; see id. at 27-28 (arguing Udy
was not prejudiced because his statements "would not have been believable").
In reality, the prejudice standard only requires Udy to show that the error was
"'harmful,'" meaning that "'absent the error, there [was] a reasonable likelihood of a
14
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more favorable outcome.'" State v. Garcia, 2001 UT App 19, ^|6, 18 P.3d 1123 (emphasis
added) (citations omitted). This standard does not require the defendant to prove that the
trial court "would have been compelled to believe" his statements at sentencing. Appellee
Br. at 27-28. It only requires him to show that the trial court "could have been swayed"
by his statements. State v. Hales, 2007 UT 14,1f92, 152 P.3d 321; see Milligan, 2011 UT
App 390, ^[16 (reversing right to allocution error in amended sentence because "we think
it is possible that [defendant] could have convinced the court to order that the amended
sentence be served concurrently with his other sentences"). Udy has met this standard.
See Appellant Br. at 39-40.
Udy had documentation to show that the art project commission was imminent,
and he was prepared to explain the "significance" of that documentation to the court. See
R.288:l-2. Defense counsel represented that he had maintained "contact with a number of
Mr. Udy's creditors" and that the majority of those creditors believed Udy's assertion that
the commission was imminent. R.288:l-2. There is a reasonable likelihood that Udy's
explanation could have swayed the trial court too, if the court had honored Udy's right to
allocution. See Hales, 2007 UT 14, TJ92. But the court did not give Udy the chance to
speak. Instead, it silenced Udy and defense counsel and imposed the new sentence based
on speculation. See Appellant Br. at 32-38. Given that the State was not seeking prison
time in Udy's case, see R.287:45, and that the court sentenced Udy to probation when it
permitted Udy to speak at the May sentencing hearing, there is a reasonable likelihood
that the outcome of the August review hearing would have been more favorable to Udy
had his rights to allocution and due process not been violated. See Appellant Br. at 39-40.
15
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This court may also reach the issue under rule 22(e). The State claims in a footnote
that rule 22(e) should not apply to the allocution issue because the issue is an "ordinary or
'run of the mill' error[]." Appellee Br. at 23 n.4 (quoting State v. Candedo, 2010 UT 32,
Tf9 n.2, 232 P.3d 1008). This argument fails because Utah case law states that rule 22(e)
encompasses sentences imposed in violation of due process, express statutory provisions,
and/or rule 22(a) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
First, "the definition of illegal sentence under rule 22(e) is sufficiently broad to
include constitutional violations that threaten the validity of the sentence." Candedo,
2010 UT 32,fflfl1, 14; see, e.g.. State v. Garner, 2008 UT App 32,ffl[18,20-25, 177 P.3d
637 (reviewing "[defendant's claim that Utah's indeterminate sentencing scheme
violates his Sixth Amendment rights" under rule 22(e)). Thus, when presented with a due
process claim that threatens the validity of the sentence, Utah appellate courts have
addressed the merits of the issue under rule 22(e). See, e.g., Candedo, 2010 UT 32, ^[14
(reviewing substantive due process claim under rule 22(e)); State v. Telford, 2002 UT 51,
Kf2-4, 48 P.3d 228 (invoking rule 22(e) to reach argument that indeterminate sentencing
violates Utah's due process clause).
Second, the definition of illegal sentence is sufficiently broad to include sentences
that fail "to comply with express statutory provisions." Candedo, 2010 UT 32, ^[13; see^
e.g.. State v. Yazzie, 2009 UT 14,ffifll-13,203 P.3d 984 (invoking rule 22(e) to reach
argument that sentence was illegal "because it did not comply with the statutory
requirement to determine concurrent or consecutive sentencing at the time of final
judgment"). Utah Code section 77-18-1(7) is an express statutory provision: "At the time
16
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of sentence, the court shall receive any testimony, evidence, or information the defendant
.. . desires to present concerning the appropriate sentence." Utah Code §77-18-1(7).
Third, u a sentence imposed in violation of rule 22(a) of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure may be considered a 'sentence imposed in an illegal manner5 under rule
22(e)." State v. Samora, 2004 UT 79, ^[13, 99 P.3d 858 (citation omitted). Rule 22(a)
includes the right to allocution: "Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the
defendant an opportunity to make a statement and to present any information in
mitigation of punishment, or to show any legal cause why sentence should not be
imposed." Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a).
In this case, as explained in the opening brief, the Court may reach the merits of
the allocution issue under rule 22(e) because the sentence was imposed in violation of the
right to allocution, as delineated in rule 22(a) and Utah Code §77-18-1(7), and the right to
due process. See Appellant Br. at 40. It was also imposed in an illegal manner because it
was imposed in violation of the rights to allocution and to due process. See id, Thus, this
Court should vacate the August sentence and impose the original May sentence.
CONCLUSION
Udy respectfully requests that this Court vacate the amended sentence dated
August 3, 2010, and impose the original sentence dated May 3, 2010.
SUBMITTED this \^_ day of January, 2012.
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